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Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West
Development, Inc.: An Analysis of Shareholder
Derivative Suits in Closely Held Corporations
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate laws that govern derivative suits attempt to dictate the
type of lawsuit a shareholder may file on behalf of a corporation.
These laws often protect the corporation at the expense of individual
shareholders. A problem arises when a closely held corporation, operated and controlled by the majority shareholders, suffers a harm
caused by its own board members. A strict interpretation of corporate law requires a shareholder that wants to pursue this claim on behalf of the corporation to make demand on the board of directors.
The board then has to agree to instigate an action against itself on
behalf of the corporation for the harm it caused.1 As a result of this
problem, a conflict of interest arises for the board members to maintain their fiduciary duty to look after the corporation’s best interests,
but at the same time not agree to put themselves in a position to be
held liable for the damages that they have caused. Hence, most directors or officers of closely held corporations do not agree to instigate the action demanded by the shareholder, and thus, the minority
shareholders are left with little remedy. To resolve this concern,
some courts have recognized “the right of a close corporation shareholder to sue directly, as an individual, on a cause of action which
would normally have to be brought derivatively.”2
In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc.,3
the Utah district court faced this exact problem. The court dismissed
Aurora Credit Services’ (“Aurora”) direct claims against Liberty West
Development (“LWD”) and granted LWD’s motion for partial

1. The board of directors usually decides which claims the corporation will pursue.
However, this “presents an obvious problem when the prospective lawsuit is against the directors themselves.” FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.3, at 387 (Hornbook Series 2000).
2. 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 59.11.50 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2000).
3. 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998).
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summary judgment regarding the derivative claims. The Utah district
court stated that Aurora did not have standing to sue derivatively.
However, on November 24, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and adopted an approach promulgated by the American Law Institute, which holds that under certain
circumstances a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation
can sue directly “on a cause of action which would normally have to
be brought derivatively.”4 In the process of deciding the Aurora
case, the Utah Supreme Court also held for the first time that a
shareholder who sues a corporation directly has to satisfy the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.5
This Note will discuss why the Utah Supreme Court correctly
decided to provide minority shareholders with a method of recourse
other than a derivative suit, but will also illustrate the flaws in the
court’s holding that a direct action must now satisfy the contemporaneous ownership requirement. One such flaw is that the language
the Utah Supreme Court used in fashioning the contemporaneous
ownership requirement for direct actions was too broad and can be
interpreted to apply not only to situations in which a minority shareholder is suing a closely held corporation directly, but also to any
other direct action that a shareholder may file for unique wrongs sustained by that individual shareholder. Another problem with the
court’s holding is that the purpose of the contemporaneous ownership requirement in avoiding strike suits is not applicable to closely
held corporations. This Note proposes that a shareholder of a closely
held corporation should not be required to satisfy the contemporaneous ownership requirement when a direct action is substituted for
a derivative action.
The analysis of the two Aurora holdings will proceed as follows:
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of corporate law, explains the distinguishing differences between a shareholder derivative
suit and direct actions by shareholders against the corporation, and
also provides an overview of the contemporaneous ownership re4. 12B FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 59.11.50.
5. The contemporaneous ownership rule requires a shareholder to prove that she was a
shareholder at the time the corporation was harmed in order to commence a derivative proceeding against the corporation. Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1; see also 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5981 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 1995).
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quirement. Part III sets forth the facts of Aurora and briefly discusses the significance of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision to allow minority shareholders to sue corporate officers directly. Part IV
establishes the three options the Utah Supreme Court had in deciding the case and analyzes why the Aurora decision correctly allowed
minority shareholders, under certain circumstances, to sue a closely
held corporation directly. Part IV also analyzes why the Utah Supreme Court incorrectly applied the contemporaneous ownership
requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 to direct actions
filed by individual shareholders and why the court incorrectly assumed that the efficient market theory applies not only to publicly
traded corporations, but also to closely held corporations. A brief
conclusion will follow in Part V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Corporate Law
A corporation is a legal person separate from its shareholders
and is entitled to its own profits and to the rights of any derivative
action brought by shareholders on its behalf.6 “A corporation is, in
its very nature, an entity operating for the benefit of its stockholders.”7 An owner or shareholder of a corporation is one “who owns or
holds a share or shares” in a corporation.8 “The distinguishing characteristics of a corporation are that it is an artificial person, a legal entity, capable of acting through its corporate officers and agents, of
suing, being sued, of taking and holding property, and of contracting in its own name, and of continuing to exist independent of individuals who compose it.”9
6. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2250 (1986) [hereinafter Corporations]; “A ‘corporation’ is an artificial person, which is created by law, or under authority of law, as a distinct
legal entity with rights and liabilities which are independent from those of the natural persons
composing the corporation.” Di Re v. Cent. Livestock Order Buying Co., 74 N.W. 2d 518,
523 (Minn. 1956); “A ‘corporation’ is a legal entity separate and distinct from its stockholders
and continuity of its existence is not interrupted by change in stock ownership.” Joe Balestrieri
& Co. v. Comm’r, 177 F.2d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1949).
7. See Van Meter v. Comm’r, 61 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1932).
8. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (7th ed. 1999).
9. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999); see also Orlob v. Wasatch Mgmt., 33
P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a corporation “is an entity separate and
distinct from its officers, shareholders, and directors and that they will not be held personally
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B. Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits Versus
Shareholder Direct Lawsuits
Because a corporation is a separate legal entity, the corporation’s
shareholders are generally not liable for any harm that the corporation may cause. Likewise, when a corporation is injured or harmed in
any way the cause of action belongs to the corporation and not to
the individual shareholders.10 A shareholder in a corporation “may
not bring suit, individually, when the whole body of stockholders is
injured.”11 However, when “the injury is one to the plaintiff as a
stockholder and to him individually, and not the corporation, as
where the action is based on a contract to which he is a party, or on
a right to which he is a party, or on a right belonging severally to
him, or on a fraud affecting him directly, it is an individual action,”
and the shareholder can pursue this action directly.12 Hence, when
the corporation or entire body of shareholders is injured and the
corporation fails to take action, the action still lies with the corporation and is derivative in nature,13 but when the injury is to the stockholder individually, the action lies with the shareholder and is direct
in nature.
As discussed previously, “courts allow derivative suits in order to
avoid leaving directors in charge of whether to have the corporation
liable for the corporation’s debts and obligations”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v.
R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley,
108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954) (“A corporation is a distinct and separate entity, irrespective of
the persons who own all its stock.”)).
10. See Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980) (“The stockholder . . . has no right, title or interest whatsoever in the claim itself—whether the action is
brought by the corporation or by the stockholder on behalf of the corporation . . . the plaintiff shareholder recovers nothing and the judgment runs in favor of the corporation.”).
11. Corporations, supra note 6, § 2245; “The only two exceptions to the general rule
that shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or
injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their
stock are: (1) a plaintiff alleges an injury separate and distinct to himself; or (2) the injuries
arise out of a special duty running from the alleged wrongdoer to the plaintiff.” Id. § 2245
(Supp. 2001) (citing Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 525 S.E.2d
441 (N.C. 2000)).
12. Richardson, 614 P.2d at 639 (citing 12B FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 5911).
13. “A stockholder’s derivative action is an action brought by one or more stockholders
of a corporation to enforce a corporate right or remedy a wrong to the corporation in cases
where the corporation, because it is controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons, fails
and refuses to take appropriate action for its own protection.” Corporations, supra note 6, §
2250; see also Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 1989) (“A derivative action allows
a shareholder to circumvent a board’s refusal to bring a suit on a claim.”).
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sue either the directors themselves or a party who controls the directors.”14 Courts have ruled that “[a] diminution in value of a shareholder’s stock is a loss recoverable only by the corporation and does
not give rise to an individual cause of action. Thus, courts have held
that a shareholder does not have standing to bring a direct cause of
action when the damage alleged is the diminished value of corporate
shares.”15 Stated another way, “[a]n action brought by a stockholder
is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock or property and not injury to
the plaintiff’s individual interest as a stockholder.”16
In its classic form, a derivative suit involves two actions brought by
an individual shareholder: (i) an action against the corporation for
failing to bring a specified suit and (ii) an action on behalf of the
corporation for harm to it identical to the one which the corporation failed to bring. . . . Since any judgment runs to the corporation, shareholder plaintiffs at best realize an appreciation in the
value of their shares.17

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 lists the procedural requirements that a derivative lawsuit must meet prior to the court hearing
the action. Rule 23.1 states:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint
shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or membership devolved on him by opera-

14. GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.8, at 425.
15. See Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D. Utah 1988).
16. Corporations, supra note 6, § 2250; “[A]n individual stockholder has no right to
bring an action in his own name and in his own behalf for a wrong committed solely against
the corporation.” Id. § 2245.
17. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); “A derivative
suit permits a shareholder to sue on behalf of the corporate entity to remedy or prevent a
wrong to the corporation. A derivative action is an exception to the usual rule that a corporation’s board of directors manages it or supervises its management and thereby controls its decisions.” Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1991) (quoting F. HODGE
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.11 (3d ed. 1987));
see also GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.1(b), at 392 (“[A] derivative suit is two suits in one: An
action against those who breached their duty to the corporation, and an action against the corporation to compel the company to pursue this claim.”).
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tion of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not
otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary,
from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure
to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or
members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation
or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in
such manner as the court directs.18

A careful reading of the rule shows that the shareholder must (1)
show that she was a shareholder at the time the corporation suffered
harm; (2) show that the action is not a collusive one intended to obtain jurisdiction in a federal court;19 (3) demand that the corporation
pursue the claim or show why such demand would be futile; and (4)
show how the shareholder will be able to adequately represent all
similarly situated shareholders.

18. Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1. See also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 which states, in
almost identical language to the Utah rule:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a
right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the
complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the
plaintiff’s share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of
law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of
the United States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege
with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from
the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation
or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (emphasis added).
19. This requirement is not applicable to the Aurora case because the action was filed in
state court.

180

5YAT.DOC

175]

3/23/02 8:58 AM

Derivative Suits in Closely Held Corporations

A major requirement that the Utah legislature has enacted
through Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 is referred to as the contemporaneous ownership requirement.20 This requirement is patterned after a similar requirement contained in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. It provides that a shareholder may not commence
“or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the shareholder was a
shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or omission
complained of.”21 “The primary purpose for the contemporaneous
ownership rule is to prevent ‘strike suits,’ where individuals purchase
shares in a corporation with litigious motives.”22 Stated another way,
the contemporaneous ownership doctrine prevents courts “from being used to litigate purchased grievances or from becoming a party
to speculative suits against corporations.”23
The contemporaneous ownership requirement is premised upon
the “efficient market theory,” which presupposes that all stock is
traded on an efficient market. Without the contemporaneous ownership requirement, “subsequent purchasers of shares could reap a
windfall from any recovery in a derivative proceeding which was not
considered in the purchase price of their shares.”24 The efficient market theory “posits that the price of a security reflects all publicly
available information about a firm, and that prices react almost instantaneously and in an unbiased manner to any new information.”25
“Researchers agree that the efficient capital market model accurately
represents the pricing behavior of stocks.”26 The contemporaneous
ownership requirement relies on the efficient market theory because
it assumes that when a new stockholder buys into a corporation that
all material, relevant information will be used to price the stock in an
efficient market. Thus, if the corporation is involved in outstanding
litigation, the stock price will already reflect the litigation. Therefore,
20. Other state legislatures have also enacted the contemporaneous ownership requirement. See, e.g., Del. Ct. Ch. R. 23.1. See also HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 362 (3d ed. 1983) (“Perhaps the most important qualification placed
upon a plaintiff-shareholder in a derivative action is that of ‘contemporaneousshareownership.’”).
21. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981.
22. Id. § 5981.10.
23. See Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981.10.
25. Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for
the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374–75 (1984).
26. Id. at 374.
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according to the contemporaneous ownership requirement, if stockholders were allowed to buy the stock after the “time of the act or
omission complained of,”27 then stockholders would receive a windfall if they also were able to participate in the recovery of the litigation.28
Another major requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
23.1 is that the complaint must allege the efforts of the plaintiff to
make demand on the directors to enforce the right that belongs to
the corporation, or, if demand is not made, the “reasons . . . for not
making the effort.”29 The demand requirement “is not merely a
technical pleading hurdle; it is based on a fundamental tenet of
American corporate law that places the responsibility for making decisions in the hands of the board of directors.”30 However, once the
directors refuse to comply with the demand, “[a] derivative action
allows a shareholder to circumvent a board’s refusal to bring a suit
on a claim.”31 However, if a derivative action is in fact brought and
an advantageous outcome results, any proceeds belong to the corporation and not to the individual shareholder.
The demand requirement assumes that the shareholder is dealing
with a disinterested board when seeking to have the corporation
bring suit because of the alleged wrong. A disinterested board is a
board that does not have any type of conflict of interest in deciding
upon the corporation’s claim. The disinterested board would therefore consider the plaintiff’s complaint and make a decision that is
best for the corporation.
In addition to these requirements, many states have enacted laws
that require plaintiffs to post security for costs of the lawsuit if the
plaintiff owns less than five percent of the outstanding shares.32 The
purpose of these statutes is also to prevent strike suits or actions that
27. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981.
28. Once the corporation recovers proceeds through the litigation, the stock price will
increase, thus resulting in a windfall to the shareholder.
29. UTAH R. CIV. P. 23.1.
30. Johnson v. Hui, 752 F. Supp. 909, 911 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (demand excused when
six of eight directors were accused of illegal activity (citing In re BankAmerica Sec. Litig., 636
F. Supp. 419, 420 (C.D. Cal. 1986)).
31. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 1989).
32. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Magaziner, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (Pa. 1965); see also Haberman v.
Tobin, 626 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980); Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 1967);
Mintz v. Allen, 254 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Tyler v. Gas Consumers Ass’n, 229
N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
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have the sole purpose of winning large attorney’s fees, but with no
intention of benefiting the corporation.33 “[S]uch strike suits were
usually brought by shareholders with only a small financial stake in
the corporation and who, therefore, had little to lose by starting an
action.”34 As previously stated above, a strike suit is defined as “a suit
by a holder of a miniscule interest in the corporation to harass and
coerce the directors into a settlement far out of proportion to the
minority shareholder’s financial interest in the object of the suit.”35
C. Closely Held Corporations
A closely held corporation has been defined in a number of
ways.36 “By definition, a close corporation is one in which the stock
is held in a few hands, or in a few families, and wherein it is not at
all, or only rarely, bought or sold.”37 The definition of a closely held
corporation that is adopted for the purposes of this Note is found in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., which states
33. See Levine, 378 F.2d at 624.
34. Id.
35. Petty v. Bank of N.M. Holding Co., 787 P.2d 443, 452 (N.M. 1990).
36. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964); see also W & W Equip. Co. v.
Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“A close corporation is one which typically
has relatively few shareholders and whose shares are not generally traded in the securities market.” (citing O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 1.02)); Berreman v. W. Publ’g Co., 615
N.W.2d 362, 367–68 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (defining close corporation as a corporation with
few shareholders, no public market for its stock, active shareholder management within the
corporation, and shareholder income derived primarily from salary not dividends); Thisted v.
Tower Mgmt. Corp., 409 P.2d 813, 820 (Mont. 1966) (noting “that a close corporation is
one in which management and ownership are ‘substantially identical to the extent that it is unrealistic to believe that the judgment of the directors will be independent of that of the stockholders’”(citation omitted)); Landstrom v. Shaver, 1997 SD 25, 561 N.W.2d 1, 13 n.15
(1997) (“Typical attributes of a close corporation are that: (1) the shareholders are few in
number, often two or three; (2) the shareholders usually live in the same geographical area,
know each other, and are well acquainted with each others’ skills in regards to the corporation;
(3) all or most of the shareholders are active in the business usually serving as directors or officers or as management; and (4) there is no established market for the corporate stock.” (citing
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987)); Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 674–
75 (Va. 2001) (asserting that “the most precise definition [of a close corporation] may be imperfect to every occasion”; however, the court noted that the corporation in question had “a
small number of shareholders with no active trading market for their shares, and substantial
majority stockholder participation in the management, direction, and operations of the corporation”); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1980) (“A ‘close corporation’
has been defined as a corporation with a small number of shareholders whose shares are not
generally traded in the securities market.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999)
(“A corporation whose stock is not freely traded and is held by only a few shareholders.”).
37. Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
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that a close corporation is defined as a corporation with: “(1) a small
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock;
and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation.”38 Generally, a
publicly held corporation is at the opposite end of the spectrum in
that it has a large number of shareholders, a national market on
which its stock is traded, and less majority participation in the management and operation of the corporation. The differences between
a publicly held corporation and a closely held corporation explain
why in certain circumstances differing laws should be applied regarding shareholder derivative lawsuits and the contemporaneous ownership requirement.
III. AURORA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Dennis W. Gay, James Hogle, Jr., and two other individuals
formed LWD in 1986 to develop an office complex in Ogden,
Utah.39 To finance the office complex, LWD borrowed money using
the office complex as collateral.40 Both Gay and Hogle controlled the
operation of LWD—Hogle was president of LWD from 1986 to
1991 and Gay served as CEO from 1990 until the company’s dissolution.41
By 1990, the initial loan used by LWD to finance the office
complex was in arrears.42 LWD also owed on several other outstanding loans, and there were several liens placed against the office
complex.43 During this same time period, Hogle was also suffering
from personal financial distress.44 For example, “Union National
Bank of Chicago sued Hogle for an unrelated debt and obtained a
money judgment against him.”45 In February of 1991, while Hogle
was still president of LWD, he “executed a security agreement in favor of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in
which he pledged his 2,500 shares of LWD stock as collateral for the
38.
39.
1998).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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judgment.”46 At the time of the pledge, Hogle valued the pledged
LWD stock at $200,000.47
Subsequently, in November of 1991, Aurora bought a “package
of assets from the FDIC at a judgment auction.”48 Included in this
package was the judgment that the FDIC had against Hogle.49 Upon
purchasing the assets, Aurora approached Hogle in December of
1991 and offered to settle the entire judgment, which was at that
point approximately $125,000, for $87,500.50 Hogle never responded to Aurora’s offer.51 In January of 1992, Aurora received the
formal assignment from the FDIC of the Hogle judgment, “including its security interest in Hogle’s LWD stock.”52 Shortly thereafter,
Aurora notified LWD and Gay of the security interest it received
from the FDIC in Hogle’s LWD shares.53 In April 1993, Aurora
foreclosed on its interest in the LWD stock, thereby becoming a
stockholder of the corporation.54
In early 1991, Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply Co. (“Restaurant Co.”) sued LWD and obtained a judgment for the nonpayment of a contract.55 Shortly thereafter, a writ of execution was obtained, a levy was recorded on the office complex, and on May 15,
1991 the office complex was sold to Restaurant Co. at a sheriff’s
sale.56 The sheriff recorded the sale and notified LWD of its sixmonth statutory right of redemption.57 LWD never redeemed the
property because less than a week after the property was sold to Restaurant Co., the property was sold to XM International (“XMI”), a
partnership formed by Gay and George Bybee.58
Despite the sale of the property to Restaurant Co. and then to
XMI, LWD represented to Aurora that it still owned the property

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1275–76.
Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

185

5YAT.DOC

3/23/02 8:58 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2002

and that it was trying to sell the property.59 Furthermore, LWD told
Aurora that it “expected to recover $800,000 to $1,000,000 of equity in the property.”60 These representations were made to Aurora
until July 7, 1993.61
After receiving the news that LWD no longer owned the property, Aurora filed a complaint in Utah district court on August 5,
1994.62 Aurora later amended its complaint on October 17, 1994,
“asserting both derivative and direct claims alleging that Gay negligently and intentionally mismanaged LWD, breached his fiduciary
duties, and wasted corporate assets.”63 The Utah district court dismissed Aurora’s direct claims on December 12, 1994 and on December 20, 1995 granted LWD’s motion for partial summary judgment holding that Aurora did not have standing to sue because
“Aurora was not a shareholder of LWD when the alleged injury occurred.”64 Aurora moved to amend its complaint after both the motion dismissing its direct claims and the summary judgment motion
dismissing its derivative claims were granted.65 Both motions were
denied, so Aurora appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.66
On November 24, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the lower court.67 The two issues that the Utah Supreme Court decided in Aurora were of first impression in the state
of Utah. The court held that in a closely held corporation a minority
shareholder could proceed directly against corporate officers.68 The
court also held that the contemporaneous ownership requirement,
which prior to this judgment applied only to derivative suits, applied
to suits filed as direct actions.69 The court’s holding does allow for
certain exceptions to the contemporaneous ownership requirement
given the appropriate circumstances; however, these exceptions are
irrelevant for the purpose of this Note because this Note proposes

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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that the contemporaneous ownership requirement should never apply to direct actions in a closely held corporation. This Note will
proceed to analyze the two holdings of the Utah Supreme Court and
discuss the reasons why the Utah Supreme Court correctly held that
a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation could sue the
corporation directly. This Note will also discuss why the Utah Supreme Court incorrectly applied the contemporaneous ownership
requirement to direct actions filed by individual shareholders in a
closely held corporation.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Aurora should have a decided impact on how corporate matters are resolved. Many officers
and directors of closely held corporations could face direct litigation
for any type of mismanagement of corporate assets. Ultimately, the
Aurora decision blurred what had previously been a clear distinction
between direct lawsuits and derivative lawsuits.70 The Aurora decision will allow what were in past decisions derivative actions to be
filed as direct actions by an individual shareholder against a closely
held corporation. The decision will also deny recovery to any shareholder of a closely held corporation that buys into the corporation at
a price that was not set by an “efficient market” by not allowing the
shareholder to recoup the difference in price from the corporation as
the result of advantageous litigation. In consequence, this Note recommends that the Utah Supreme Court in future decisions not apply
the contemporaneous ownership requirement to direct actions of
shareholders in closely held corporations.
A. Closely Held Corporations and Derivative Lawsuits
Based on prior Utah precedent, the Aurora claims were clearly
derivative in nature. In Utah, “mismanagement of the corporation
gives rise to a cause of action in the corporation, even if the management results in damage to stockholders by depreciating the value
of the corporation’s stock.”71 Prior to the Aurora case, Utah law was
very clear as to the differences between a derivative and direct action.
70. Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980).
71. Id. at 640 (citing Morris v. Ogden State Bank, 28 P.2d 138 (Utah 1934) (citing 3B
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.1.16[1] (2d ed. 1980) and
12B FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 5911)).
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The Utah Supreme Court in Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.
stated:
Suits which are said to be derivative, and therefore come within the
rule [Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1], are those which seek to
enforce any right which belongs to the corporation and is not being enforced, such as the liability of corporate officers or majority
shareholders for mismanagement, to recover corporate assets and
related claims, to enforce rights of the corporation by virtue of its
contract with a third person, and to enjoin those in charge of the
corporation from causing it to commit an ultra vires act. On the
other hand, if the injury is one to the plaintiff as a stockholder and
to him individually, and not to the corporation, as where the action
is based on a contract to which he is a party, or on a right belonging severally to him, or on a fraud affecting him directly, it is an individual action.72

The Utah Supreme Court’s holding that minority shareholders
in a closely held corporation can sue the corporate officers directly
will drastically affect corporate officer decision-making because directors of closely held corporations will now possibly be sued directly
for any mismanagement of corporate assets. Prior to the Aurora
case, courts across America adopted one of three approaches in dealing with shareholder lawsuits in closely held corporations.
1. Traditional approach of treating closely held corporations by the
letter of the law
The traditional approach, adopted by, among other states, Delaware, is that the rules that apply to large publicly held corporations
should also apply to closely held corporations, meaning that shareholder derivative laws apply to closely held corporations.73 An important case in the development of the traditional approach is Maki v.
Estate of Ziehm.74
In Maki, two shareholders equally owned a closely held corporation. Shareholder A died and Shareholder B filed suit against the es72. Id. at 639 (quoting MOORE ET AL., supra note 71, ¶ 23.1.16[1]).
73. See Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the state of Delaware is not ready to loosen the derivative action requirements in a closely
held corporation setting).
74. 391 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that the claim of misappropriation of corporate funds may not be addressed in a direct action by a stockholder, but must be
brought in the name of the corporation, since the damages, if any, belong to the corporation).
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tate of Shareholder A claiming, “the decedent misappropriated the
assets of the corporation to his own use.”75 The court dismissed
Shareholder B’s claims, holding that Shareholder B could not bring
the claim individually.76
The Maki court held that “a derivative action is the appropriate
vehicle for the protection of the rights of the corporation’s creditors,
since corporate liabilities must be extinguished before any corporate
assets may be distributed to the stockholders.”77 Otherwise, a shareholder could use a direct action against the corporation to circumvent the liabilities that the corporation has to its creditors and all
benefits from the direct action would be received by the shareholder.78
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this important principle in
the case of Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., where it stated that
the direct action, if not used correctly, “and in lieu of a derivative action, is likely to result in grave injustices, not the least of which is the
diversion of assets recovered in a lawsuit from creditors of a corporation to stockholders thereby reversing the long established substantive rules of law” that a creditor has priority over a shareholder “to
the assets of an insolvent corporation.”79 Hence, allowing only derivative actions as an exclusive remedy when the corporation has
been damaged protects “the interests of all parties harmed by damage to the corporation.”80
The reasoning of the Maki court, however, is flawed because it
does not take into account all types of circumstances that may be
present in a given action involving a closely held corporation. By requiring a shareholder of a closely held corporation to file a derivative
action for any harm that the corporation sustains, the court is impliedly holding that the procedural requirements of a derivative action
must be met prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, the
shareholder would first have to make demand upon the officers or
directors of the corporation, which in this case was the decedent’s
estate. The estate of the decedent has a conflict of interest in deciding between the best interests of the estate and the best interests of
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
614 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah 1980).
GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.1(a), at 391.
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the corporation. Assuming that the decedent’s estate does not agree
to bring the suit, the shareholder would have to file a derivative action against the estate to recover for the mismanagement of the assets. However, if any judgment is recovered through litigation, the
judgment will be the property of the corporation and thus will revert
back to the defendants in the litigation proceedings.81 Thus, unlike a
direct action that results in a possible recovery by the individual
shareholder,82 any recovery of a derivative action belongs to the corporation whether it is a publicly held or closely held corporation.83
Therefore, although the derivative action may provide a remedy for
shareholders in a publicly held corporation, it can hardly be argued
that the same type of remedy is available for shareholders in a closely
held corporation.84
2. Closely held corporations treated like partnerships
Another approach quite different than the traditional approach is
to not apply derivative rules to any type of closely held corporation.85
The important case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England held that a closely held corporation is essentially an incorporated partnership and thus minority shareholders should have the
right to sue individually.86
In Donahue, a minority shareholder brought an action against
the officers and directors of a closely held corporation seeking to rescind the corporation’s purchase of an officer’s shares.87 The Donahue court reasoned that the similarities in business forms between a
partnership and a closely held corporation did not warrant a great
disparity in their legal treatment.88 The court noted that many other
81. The rationale of courts in allowing the proceeds to revert back to the defendants is
twofold: (1) the interests of other parties including creditors outweighs recovery by an individual shareholder and (2) the previous action should provide an incentive to the board of directors to change future conduct. Id. § 4.3.1(b).
82. Id. § 4.3.1(a).
83. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989).
84. See infra Part IV.B.1.
85. See Kirk v. First Nat’l Bank of Columbus, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977); see
also Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
86. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass.
1975).
87. Id. at 508.
88. Id. at 512, 515; see also Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 220 (“Close corporations bear a
striking resemblance to a partnership. In essence, the ownership of a close corporation is lim-
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courts have ruled that the “close corporation is often little more than
an ‘incorporated’ or ‘chartered’ partnership.”89 The Donahue court
further stated that “[m]any close corporations are ‘really partnerships, between two or three people who contribute their capital,
skills, experience and labor.”90 By so holding that a closely held corporation is in essence a partnership, the rule allows courts to convert
“all intracorporate disputes that would be normally characterized as
derivative actions into direct actions whenever the case involves a
closely held corporation.”91
Some of the policy reasons promulgated by the Donahue court
involved the fact that because “stockholders in [a] close corporation
owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another,” the procedural rules of derivative lawsuits would be inapplicable in a closely
held corporate setting where corporate shareholders are little more
than incorporated partners.92 Other courts have asserted that
“[w]here several owners own an enterprise together (as they usually
do in a close corporation), their relationship should be considered a
fiduciary one similar to the relationship among partners.”93 Even
Chief Justice Burger, who at the time was a judge on the D.C. Circuit, voiced his stance on the matter by stating that
[in] an intimate business venture such as this, stockholders of a
close corporation occupy a position similar to that of joint adventurers and partners. While courts have sometimes declared stockholders ‘do not bear toward each other that same relation of trust
and confidence which prevails in partnerships,’ this view ignores the
practical realities of the organization and functioning of a small . . .
corporation organized to carry on a small business enterprise in

ited to a small number of people who are dependent on each other for the enterprise to succeed. Just like a partnership, the relationship between the shareholders must be one of trust,
confidence and loyalty if the close corporation is to thrive.”); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01 cmt. e (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
89. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
90. Id. at 512 (citing Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 805 (1965)).
91. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01 cmt. e.
92. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
93. Noakes v. Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682, 687 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting O’NEAL
& THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 8.08(3)).
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which the stockholders, directors, and managers are the same persons.94

Furthermore, the Donahue court recognized that another governing body, namely the Internal Revenue Service, has through statute recognized that Subchapter S corporations are usually closely
held corporations and for tax purposes are treated exactly like a partnership.95
Although the reasoning of the Donahue court is persuasive, the
law should not be changed to treat closely held corporations as partnerships and exempt shareholders from the derivative lawsuit requirements in all circumstances. Similar to the partnership form and
unlike a publicly traded corporation, a shareholder in a closely held
corporation does not have the flexibility or remedy of trading his
shares in the corporation in a public market. However, despite these
disadvantages, the corporate form should govern in most circumstances and the desire of the corporation’s founders in choosing the
corporate form over the partnership form should be respected.96
Furthermore, it is important to consider the interests and rights
of creditors “since corporate liabilities must be extinguished before
any corporate assets may be distributed to the stockholders.”97 Finally, allowing a closely held corporation to be treated as a partnership may give rise to a multiplicity of actions depending on the
number of shareholders in the corporation. Directors and officers
could be sued for any type of mismanagement of assets no matter
how nominal the value. For these reasons, the closely held corporate
form should not be treated as a partnership in shareholder proceedings.
3. The moderate approach of the American Law Institute
The American Law Institute has promulgated a more moderate
middle approach. The American Law Institute’s proposal developed
94. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (quoting Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486
(D.C. Cir. 1957)).
95. Id. at 512 n.12.
96. See Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). Advantages of the
corporate form include: “(a) Power to take, hold, and convey property in the corporate name;
(b) Power to sue and to be sued in the corporate name; (c) Centralization of management in
the board of directors; (d) Ready transferability of interests; (e) Perpetual succession; and (f)
Limited liability.” HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 20, § 79.
97. Maki v. Estate of Ziehm, 391 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (App. Div. 1977).
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primarily because of a landmark case that was decided in 1956 by the
Ninth Circuit.98 In Watson v. Button, the court held that a direct action may be substituted for a derivative action when a multiplicity of
actions will not result from the ruling, the corporate creditors will
not be hurt, and all stockholders will benefit equally from the direct
ruling.99 The American Law Institute, following the Watson precedent, states:
In the case of a closely held corporation . . . the court in its discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action,
exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to
derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds that
to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.100

In adopting this rule the American Law Institute stated “the
concept of a corporate injury that is distinct from any injury to the
shareholders approaches the fictional in the case of a firm with only a
handful of shareholders.”101 In essence, what the American Law Institute and the Watson court have done is incorporate three policy
requirements that determine when minority shareholders in closely
held corporations must sue derivatively. The American Law Institute
and Watson then state that when the facts of each individual case satisfy the three policy requirements of the above-cited passage, a derivative lawsuit is no longer warranted and a direct action should be
allowed. It is important to note that not only does the American Law
Institute recommend that a direct claim be substituted for a deriva-

98. Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956).
99. Id. at 237 (involving two shareholders one of which misappropriated the assets of
the corporation at the expense of the other shareholder).
100. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01(d).
101. Id. at cmt. e; Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1991)
(holding that a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation may bring a direct action
rather than a derivative action). Recent decisions that have recognized the right of a shareholder of a close corporation to sue directly include: Orsi v. Sunshine Art Studios, Inc., 874 F.
Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1995); Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980);
Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Ga. 1983); Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282
(Idaho 1986); Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1995); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638,
648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 74
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Yackel v. Kay, 642 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Noakes v.
Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).

193

5YAT.DOC

3/23/02 8:58 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2002

tive claim, but the Institute also recommends that any action be exempt “from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative actions.”102 Thus, a direct action that is used in place of a derivative action does not need to follow the procedural requirements of a
derivative action.
The balanced approach that the American Law Institute promulgates is correct in not making every action a direct action, but in allowing the courts to have discretion to decide when the three policy
requirements are met and then to treat the closely held corporation
accordingly. However, the rationale of the first policy requirement of
avoiding a multiplicity of actions may be misplaced because in a
closely held corporation there are usually very few shareholders, and
where there are few shareholders (each of whom may bring one
claim), there cannot be a multiplicity of actions, so the policy requirement results in a non-issue. In contrast, avoiding a multiplicity
of actions does matter in a publicly held corporation because it
would be overwhelming for both the courts and the individual corporation to have a different lawsuit by every shareholder over the
same claim. The second policy requirement respects the Maki court
in protecting creditors’ interests before the interests of the individual
shareholders. Finally, the third requirement ensures that not only
will the shareholder bringing the action benefit from the decision of
the court, but also ensures that other shareholders are protected in
the recovery process.
B. The Aurora Court’s Partial Adoption of the
American Law Institute’s Proposal
The Utah Supreme Court partially adopted the American Law
Institute’s proposal as stated above. The court held that “a court
may allow a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to
proceed directly against corporate officers.”103 However, the court
also held that “permitting a shareholder to proceed directly for
claims against a closely held corporation does not exempt the shareholder from the contemporaneous ownership rule.”104 Unlike the
American Law Institute’s recommendation that direct actions not be
102. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01(d).
103. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah
1998).
104. Id.
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subject to the “restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative
actions,”105 the Utah Supreme Court requires direct actions to now
jump through the procedural requirement of the contemporaneous
ownership rule. The remainder of this Note will show why the Utah
Supreme Court was correct in its first holding of allowing derivative
actions to be substituted with direct actions in the case of a closely
held corporation.106 This Note will also discuss why the Utah Supreme Court was incorrect when it applied the contemporaneous
ownership requirement to direct proceedings in a closely held corporation.
1. The Utah Supreme Court correctly allowed minority shareholders to
sue a closely held corporation’s officers directly
The Utah Supreme Court correctly held that a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation should be able to file a direct action instead of a derivative action against the corporation’s officers.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court correctly held that in a direct
action the minority shareholder is not required to meet “many of the
procedural requirements of a derivative action.”107 However, the
court should have also held that the contemporaneous ownership requirement does not apply to direct actions filed against closely held
corporations.
“[T]he procedural rules often applicable to derivative actions—
such as a requirement that the plaintiff post a security-for-expenses
bond—often make little sense in the context of a dispute between
persons who are effectively incorporated partners.”108 Furthermore, it
is difficult to envision a minority shareholder required to make demand on the closely held corporation’s board, where the board may
have very well caused the harm the corporation suffered. “[T]he likelihood of a disinterested board is far smaller in [a closely held corporation] because the majority stockholders are likely also to be the

105. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01(d).
106. Recently, the Utah Supreme Court attempted to distinguish part of its correct holding in Aurora. See Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 991 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah
1999) (“The injury alleged in Aurora Credit was suffered uniquely by Aurora Credit and
therefore was much more direct than is a typical derivative claim.”); see also Warner v. DMG
Color, Inc., 20 P.3d 868, 873 (Utah 2000).
107. Aurora, 970 P.2d at 1281.
108. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, § 7.01 cmt. e.
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firm’s managers.”109 Thus, as previously discussed, a conflict of interest arises for the board members to maintain their fiduciary duty to
look after the corporation’s best interests, but at the same time not
agree to sue themselves and be held liable for the damages that they
have caused. Hence, most directors or officers do not agree to instigate this action.
A new problem arises after demand is made upon the corporation’s board and the action is refused by the board. The shareholder’s only remedy is to file a derivative action. However, as discussed previously, any recovery or judgment that is awarded from the
derivative lawsuit belongs to the corporation and not to the individual shareholder.110 A number of courts have recognized that “it is often difficult and futile to bring a derivative action against a closely
held corporation”111 because “[e]ven if a minority shareholder overcomes procedural hurdles in a derivative action, a strong disadvantage is that any recovery accrues to the corporation and hence remains under the control of the [majority shareholders, the] very
parties who may have been defendants in the litigation.”112 This is
why some courts have permitted “oppressed minority shareholders
to bring direct suits for breaches of fiduciary duties the majority
shareholders owe minority shareholders even though the plaintiffs’
grievance is based primarily on damage to the corporation. Courts
need not ignore the reality that the litigation is really a dispute
among shareholders.”113 “Thus, a derivative remedy is not an effective remedy because the wrongdoers would be the principal beneficiaries of the recovery.”114
Another important policy implication in favor of adopting the
American Law Institute’s approach is the fact that a shareholder in a
closely held corporation typically “has a substantial percentage of his
personal assets invested in the corporation.”115 In contrast to a
109. Id.
110. See Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989).
111. Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 647–48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that
“if a corporation is closely held, a court in its discretion, may treat an action raising derivative
claims as a direct action” (quoting AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d), at 713 (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1991)).
112. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1991).
113. Id.
114. Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221.
115. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass.
1975) (citing Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583–84 (1965)).
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shareholder of a publicly held corporation, the minority shareholder
cannot sell his stock for market value on a public stock exchange.
Furthermore, just as a partner in a partnership “cannot transfer his
interest in the partnership so as to give his assignee a right to participate in the management or business affairs of the continuing partnership without the agreement of the other partners” so too can a
closely held corporation’s shareholders impose restrictions on the
sale of any stock of the corporation.116 The minority shareholder’s
only recourse is to deal with the wrongdoing majority shareholders.117 Where a shareholder in a large, publicly held corporation can
find many interested people or entities willing to buy his stock, the
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation is “trapped in a
disadvantageous situation from which he cannot be easily extricated”
because there is generally no available market for his shares.118 Thus,
it is very difficult for a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to regain her investment when the majority shareholders harm
the corporation in some way.
Despite these very persuasive arguments in favor of adopting the
American Law Institute’s approach, many courts have sharply criticized the American Law Institute’s proposal. In Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., the court stated:
Ohio, like a few other states, has expanded the ‘special injury’ doctrine into a general exception for closely held corporations, treating
them as if they were partnerships. . . . The American Law Institute
recommends that other states do the same. The premise of this extension may be questioned. Corporations are not partnerships.
Whether to incorporate entails a choice of many formalities. Commercial rules should be predictable; this objective is best served by
treating corporations as what they are, allowing the investors and
other participants to vary the rules by contract if they think deviations are warranted. So it is understandable that not all states have
joined the parade.119

116. See id. at 512 n.13 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 515.
118. See Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 220.
119. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383–84 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). In a recent decision, the Virginia Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the
Bagdon court and rejected the American Law Institute’s proposal. See Simmons v. Miller, 544
S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va. 2001).
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Furthermore, in Landstrom v. Shaver,120 the South Dakota Supreme Court argued that minority shareholders in closely held corporations are adequately protected by putting the proceeds of recovery back into the corporation because the value of the minority
shareholder’s stock is restored to its original value.121 The Landstrom
court also held that allowing the recovery to inure to the corporation
guarantees the protection of all shareholders and creditors and respects the separate and distinct features of the corporate entity.122
The Landstrom court categorically rejected the American Law Institute’s proposal by reasoning that the Institute’s position would potentially allow minority shareholders to force majority shareholders
“by litigation (or even in some cases, the threat of it) to buy out the
minority shareholders’ shares ‘which corporate law rarely if ever requires.’”123
In summary, both courts argued that maintaining respect for the
corporate entity is of supreme importance. The Bagdon court argued
that corporate law should be predictable, and the Landstrom court
further asserted that all shareholders and creditors should be protected in any action that is filed to remedy a corporate harm. The
Landstrom court felt that minority interests were adequately protected by the requirement that proceeds of the action flow directly to
the corporation because the value of all shares, including those belonging to minority shareholders, would be increased. The Landstrom court also expressed concern regarding the possibility of majority shareholders being forced into buying out minority shareholders’
ownership interests under the threat of litigation.
Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court was correct to adopt
the American Law Institute’s proposal because it allows courts to use
their own discretion in taking into account the factors emphasized by
both the Bagdon and Landstrom courts. The American Law Institute’s approach still protects creditors before shareholders and also
requires that one shareholder not be able to recover proceeds at the
expense of another. In addition, the Bagdon court’s argument that
the corporate form must be respected is not without blemish. The
Bagdon court, by holding that a corporation should never be treated

120.
121.
122.
123.
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as a partnership, impliedly held that a closely held corporation should
always be governed by the same rules that govern publicly traded
corporations. While such a position may be reasonable and fitting in
most circumstances, this Note has offered various circumstances under which the rules that apply to publicly held corporations should
not be applied to closely held corporations. For example, the Landstrom court concluded that receiving an appreciation in the value of
her shares through the recovery process is the only remedy available
to a minority shareholder.124 But this view fails to take into account
the crucial factor of control; majority shareholders are ultimately in
charge of the proceeds recovered by the corporation. The majority
shareholders, who are the wrongdoers in the lawsuit, are also the
principal beneficiaries because they control the recovery’s ultimate
use. The minority shareholder is therefore left powerless and with little remedy. Typically a minority shareholder is someone who “has a
substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation.”125 These minority shareholders are left with two options: they
can (1) hope that the recovery proceeds are used by the majority
shareholders in a manner that will ultimately increase the value of the
corporation, or (2) sell their stock in the corporation because of
strained relations with the majority shareholders. Many minority
shareholders may be unwilling to explore the first option because of
distrust arising from mismanagement by the majority shareholders in
the first instance. The only remaining course of action then becomes
the second option. “Thus, in a close corporation, the minority
stockholders may be trapped in a disadvantageous situation. No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority. The outsider would have the same difficulties. To cut losses,
the minority stockholder may be compelled to deal with the majority.”126 Hence, the most plausible method of recourse available to a
minority shareholder will likely be to sell her shares to the majority
shareholders with the majority holding all or most of the bargaining
power with regard to price. The end result would be the opposite
outcome of what the Landstrom court intended, but this time it
would be the minority shareholder being forced to sell her shares to

124. Id.
125. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass.
1975) (citing Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583–84 (1965)).
126. Id. at 515.
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the majority shareholders, a result “which corporate law rarely if ever
requires.”127
2. The Utah Supreme Court incorrectly applied the contemporaneous
ownership doctrine to direct lawsuits
The Aurora court incorrectly held that “permitting a shareholder
to proceed directly for claims against a closely held corporation does
not exempt the shareholder from the contemporaneous ownership
rule.”128 In essence, what the court said was that now not only derivative actions, but also all direct actions by shareholders against
closely held corporations must meet the contemporaneous ownership requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.
The purpose of the contemporaneous ownership requirement “is
to prevent ‘strike suits,’ where individuals purchase shares in a corporation with litigious motives. In the absence of the contemporaneous
ownership rule, subsequent purchasers of shares could reap a windfall
from any recovery in a derivative proceeding which was not considered in the purchase price of their shares.”129 Stated another way, the
contemporaneous ownership requirement is intended to (1) prevent
individuals from buying a stock and then pursuing litigation on matters that occurred prior to their ownership of the stock,130 (2) prevent shareholders from buying into a corporation at a devalued price
and then receiving a windfall from advantageous litigation on matters that occurred prior to their ownership of the stock,131 and (3)
prevent a multiplicity of suits being filed by various stockholders.132
It was incorrect for the Utah Supreme Court to apply the contemporaneous ownership requirement to direct actions filed against
closely held corporations.133 The contemporaneous ownership requirement is not the only way to protect closely held corporations

127. Landstrom, 561 N.W.2d at 15 (quoting Frank v. Hadesman & Frank, Inc., 83 F.3d
158, 162 (7th Cir. 1996)).
128. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah
1998).
129. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981.10.
130. See Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315, 317 (10th Cir. 1984).
131. See Bank of Santa Fe v. Petty, 867 P.2d 431, 434 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
132. DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 597 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
133. For example, the state of California has left broad discretion to the courts as to
when the contemporaneous ownership requirement should be applied even to derivative proceedings. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1990).
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from strike suits. For example, as stated previously, many owners of
closely held corporations:
impose restrictions on transfers to stock designed to prevent outsiders who are unacceptable to the other stockholders from acquiring an interest in the close corporation. These restrictions often
take the form of agreements among the stockholders and the corporation or by-laws which give the corporation or the other stockholders a right of ‘first refusal’ when any stockholder desires to sell
his shares.134

The contemporaneous ownership requirement’s purpose of
eliminating strike suits is moot in closely held corporations because
two other factors already serve that purpose, namely, the lack of a
public market for the trading of closely held shares and the small
number of shares outstanding in a closely held corporation. These
two factors make it virtually impossible for someone to buy into
closely held stock and receive a windfall from advantageous litigation.
The contemporaneous ownership requirement is also based on
the assumption of the “efficient market theory.” The efficient market
theory “posits that the price of a security reflects all publicly available
information about a firm, and that prices react almost instantaneously and in an unbiased manner to any new information.”135 “Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that
the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects
all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”136 The market acts “as the unpaid agent of the investor,
informing him that given all the information available to it, the value
of the stock is worth the market price.”137
The contemporaneous ownership requirement relies on the efficient market theory because it assumes that when a new stockholder
buys into a corporation, all material, relevant information will be
used to price the stock in an efficient market. Thus, if there is out134. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 n.13 (Mass.
1975).
135. Dennis, supra note 25, at 374–75; see also In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp.
960, 975 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that the efficient market theory holds that “all announcements of financial results and other developments are quickly incorporated into the everchanging market price of the company’s stock”).
136. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
137. Id. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
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standing litigation involving the corporation, the litigation will already be reflected in the stock price. Therefore, according to the
contemporaneous ownership requirement, stockholders who buy
stock after the “time of the act or omission complained of”138 should
not be able to participate in the recovery of the litigation. Otherwise,
these stockholders would receive a windfall.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that the contemporaneous
ownership requirement should apply to direct actions because of the
assumption that any purchaser of the stock
who becomes an owner after the occurrence of wrongful corporate
conduct paid a price for the stock reflecting the misdeed and that,
therefore, the purchaser suffers no injury from the wrongful conduct. This assumption is equally as true for the purchaser of stock
in a closely held corporation as in a large publicly traded corporation.139

Hence, the Utah Supreme Court assumes that just as publicly
held corporate stock is traded on an efficient market, so too is closely
held corporate stock. However, this assumption is in error. As stated
previously the definition of a closely held corporation is a corporation with “(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market
for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation.”140 Focusing on element two of the definition shows that a
closely held corporation has “no ready market for the corporate
stock.”141 Because a closely held corporation by definition does not
have a ready market for its stock, it is incorrect to assume that after
the wrong occurred, a purchaser of the stock “paid a price for the
stock reflecting the misdeed.”142 Thus, a shareholder that buys into a
closely held corporation that suffers some type of harm will most
likely buy in at a price that is greater than market value because the
stock is traded on an inefficient market that has inadequate informa138. 13 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 5981.
139. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah
1998).
140. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975); see also Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989) (“[A] close corporation is
a corporation with a few shareholders and whose corporate shares are not generally traded on a
securities market.”).
141. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
142. Aurora, 970 P.2d at 1281.
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tion to adjust the price downward. But if the corporation does not
pursue the claim through litigation, the shareholder will not be able
to recoup part of her investment because at the time the corporation
was harmed she did not own the stock. More importantly, even the
American Law Institute has recognized that in circumstances where
(1) the wrongdoing was not made public, (2) the purchasing party
did not know about the wrongdoing, or (3) the stock price did not
reflect the wrongdoing, the contemporaneous ownership requirement should not be applied.143
Furthermore, even if closely held corporate stock were traded on
an efficient market it still does not mean that the contemporaneous
ownership requirement should apply to direct actions. In an efficient
market the contemporaneous ownership requirement does not always prevent a windfall from accruing to the purchasing party. For
example, even if the purchaser knows about the damage to the corporation, “this does not mean that the share price will incorporate a
discount fully reflecting the damage. If the buyer expects that the
corporation can recover compensation from the wrongdoer, then the
price of the shares should reflect this potential recovery” discounted
by the costs of the litigation and the possibility of non-recovery by
the corporation.144
In situations in which the wrongdoing was not fully disclosed,
courts should not assume there will be a windfall. Nor should courts
assume that there is a windfall when the wrongdoing is disclosed, but
the party purchasing control buys his or her shares from stockholders
who were not the wrongdoers. After all, in this instance, the buyer
presumably paid a price reflecting the possibility of corporate recovery.145
Hence, the Utah Supreme Court was wrong to assume that the
efficient market theory applies to the trading of closely held corporate stock. For the above stated reasons, the contemporaneous ownership requirement should not apply to direct actions in closely held
corporations.

143. GEVURTZ, supra note 1, § 4.3.2 (citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 88, § 7.02(a)(1)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court’s holding in Aurora was
correct insofar that it allows minority shareholders of closely held
corporations to sue the corporation directly for injuries sustained by
the corporation. However, the decision to require direct actions to
meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1 was
incorrect based upon the analysis in Part IV of this Note. The contemporaneous ownership requirement’s purpose is to avoid strike
suits and is based on the premise that all stock is traded on an efficient market. As Part IV of this Note illustrated, the small number of
shares outstanding and the lack of a public market in a closely held
corporate setting serve the purpose of eliminating strike suits. Thus,
closely held corporations do not need to be governed by the contemporaneous ownership requirement. Furthermore, it is incorrect
to assume that stock of a closely held corporation is traded on an efficient market because a closely held corporation by definition is a
corporation that has “no ready market for the corporate stock.”146
Therefore, Utah courts in the future should not apply the contemporaneous ownership requirement to direct actions filed by minority
shareholders of closely held corporations.
Robbie G. Yates

146. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
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